Back to the drawing board

When a similar kind of incident occurs and lives are lost in similar fashion over and over again, one may be forced to or rather it would be wise to introspect on what is it that needs to be done differently so to avoid the loss of lives.

This is not to imply that those at the helm of the affairs are not doing enough. Yet, there is surely something that is not enough or maybe that needs to be changed.

The reference here is to the recent events that have been repeatedly occurring in Rajouri and Poonch Districts of Jammu & Kashmir over the past few months.

When the attack happened last month, in Nov’23 in these areas, there was a reference on social media regarding Operation (Op) Sarp Vinash which was conducted 20 years ago in the same areas. The same operation has been referred to over and over again, more so after the recent terror attack on 21 Dec’23.  Some even going to the extent of proposing an Op. Sarp Vinash 2.0 as a solution to the consistent terror attacks in Rajouri and Poonch.

For the uninformed, Op. Sarp Vinash was conducted in April 2003 to flush out a large number of terrorists who had been ensconced in Hil Kaka area of the Pir Panjal Ranges. The operation had been planned over a period of 3-4 months and the operation had resulted in elimination of many terrorists, 45 killed at the area around Hil Kaka and about 7 of them killed while trying to flee to the valley. One can imagine the scale at which the operations were conducted; with a lot of deliberation and planning, without haste.

I have seen suggestions going around on social media that maybe the LOC should be tightened and the Intelligence Grid should be tightened and so on. Well, under the current scenario, since one finds a lot of reference to Op. Sarp Vinash, what could be the takeaways from that operation? I have been privileged enough to have numerous conversations around Op Sarp Vinash, with someone who was at the helm of the affairs then and also about the current state of affairs there.

And the gist of those conversations is that population remains the key in counterinsurgency operations. The areas that are affected can generally be divided into :

1. Black
2. Grey
3. White

The Black areas are the ones which are under complete domination of the anti-national elements, the grey areas are the ones where there is a constant see saw. This means that the population in a grey area would generally be in favour of the side which seems victorious and in control. The white areas are the ones which are totally free of the anti-national elements.

It is obvious from the above classification that when an area is completely dominated by anti-national elements, it is close to impossible to reach the terrorists in these areas because no information about them will be revealed by the locals. These are the liberated zones which also act as bases, for the infiltrators. In the grey areas, there may be some who may be willing to support the security forces and some other who may take the side of the terrorists. The white areas are the ones where the terrorists will find no support and hence it is in a zone which they would totally avoid.

It makes all sense that the LOC should be strengthened to curb the infiltration. But the question then arises as to what if there is also already a liberated zone/es where infiltrators are already present.

Generally, the modus operandi of these infiltrators would be that first they cross the fence and ambushes laid by the forces and come in to our areas. To do this as well, they are provided information by the locals who appraise them about the gaps in the security and they then try to exploit these gaps. Then, they are handed over or connected to a local guide who would take them through the countryside/ hinterland which are black areas (dominated either by the guide’s community or militants themselves, thereby facing no resistance to their movement) and then finally reach a particular receptacle (a base which is definitely a liberated zone occupied by militants where they are not being challenged nor fear it). This is also probably a place where all such infiltrators keep collecting and they also have logistical support that is needed to fight the security forces.

Does the solution seem obvious now? The solution then lies in finding the receptacle. Once such base/es are found and destroyed, the infiltration is controlled on its own. Without a place to go to, without logistical support, the infiltrators can barely survive and act. This brings us back to the Black, Grey and White zones in our areas of responsibility. So, in conclusion, the more   white zones we have, the less or nil control will rest with the militants .

So yes, while LOC and also the intelligence grid needs to be tightened, that alone may not be enough. Enough efforts have to be made to convert the hinterland areas into white zones and weed out any liberated zone/es that may be prevalent.

A closer look at Op Sarp Vinash would reveal this aspect. As soon as the terrorists’ receptacle on Hil Kaka was destroyed, the terrorists fled, not to return for a very long time.

‘Public opinion is won through great victories and the occupation of the enemy’s capital.’ – Carl von Clausewitz

The more victories we can have, the more the population will be on side. Without the support of the population, the guerrilla or an insurgent is powerless.

As Lt Gen Hardev Singh Lidder PVSM, UYSM, YSM, VSM categorically states and believes ‘He who owns the banyan tree will own the countryside’.

The banyan tree is where the people of the village gather and indulge in gossip through the day. It is extremely important as to who is a part of that gossip; someone in the uniform or the flea.

Apart from these factors, one cannot rule out the factors that the density of troops in the Valley currently and the winter season makes the North of Pir Panjal less accessible thus rendering this area to be preferred more.

Cover Pic credit : The Week